Book Review: "Osama Bin Laden"

Scheuer, Michael.  Osama Bin Laden.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

About a month ago, I attended a book signing/lecture at Powell's (probably the greatest book store in the world), and I had the pleasure of listening to Michael Scheuer talk about his latest book, Osama Bin Laden.  He gave a very good talk about the lack of credible scholarship done on Bin Laden, informing us that, with a couple notable exceptions, virtually every book published on Bin Laden relied almost exclusively on secondary sources, like the testimonies of family, friends, acquaintances, and politicians.  Let's take some particularly troublesome examples:  Jonathan Randall's "Osama: The Making of a Terrorist" relies on 2 primary citations, Marc Sageman's "Understanding Terror Networks" relies on 2 citations, Lawrence Wright's "The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11" relies on 28 citations, 22 of which refer to just 4 primary documents, and Roy Gutman's "How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan" relies on just 11 citations.  Scheuer does commend authors Peter Bergen, Abdel Bari Arwan, Steve Coll, and Brynjar Lia, but he makes it abundantly clear that there has been a serious lack of scholarly work dealing with Bin Laden's own writings and recordings.  It seems to me the biggest reason for such a lack is a result of Bin Laden's intelligent critique of western ideology.  If Bin Laden merely spouted hate in the form of logically fallacious and ludicrous statements, we could dismiss him.  Unfortunately, it's not so easy.  Bin Laden makes intelligent and logical arguments, and in looking at his character, Scheuer finds a man who is pious, generous, brave, charismatic, patient, and gifted with strategic ability (ix).  Because of this, he is a hero throughout the middle east and a formidable foe to the United States.  Unfortunately, he's been characterized in the media as "madly ambitious, bloodthirsty, irrational, and (a) messianic individual of limited intelligence" (ix).  In other words - a less than formidable opponent to the United States, therefore one not to be taken seriously.

This dehumanizing characterization has been championed to maintain western ideology.  We want to consider ourselves on the leading front of human rights, so we won't seriously consider his writings disputing our foreign policy.  We want to consider ourselves a militarily unbeatable force, so we won't consider his writings on effectively combating a foreign invader.  We want to consider democracy a universally justified political institution, so we won't consider the resonance his writings and teachings on Sharia law have had throughout the Muslim world.  In other words, we won't consider him at all - we will reduce him to nothing, thereby preserving our ideological assumptions that guide our foreign policies.  This has had terrible consequences.  By labeling Bin Laden as simply a "nihilist," "mass murderer," "Nazi," "atrocity," "Islamofascist," "madman," and "criminal," we've completely lost sight of our enemy.

Scheuer makes comparisons to leaders in American history.  Imagine if Ulysses S. Grant dismissed Robert E. Lee as a fanatic.  I would imagine here a very irresponsibly organized military strategy.  The same could be said if Robert E. Lee reduced Grant to a drunk.  And Scheuer writes, "Eisenhower did not think he could defeat Rommel in North Africa by calling him a criminal" (xi).  But this is exactly what we've done with Bin Laden.  Scheuer, having an archive of 159 documents that total 791 pages, wrote a book on Bin Laden that casts him in a very different light than had been previously shed.  Scheuer has made a career of fighting terrorism, serving as chief of the Bin Laden tracking unit in his 22 year career with the CIA, so he is not writing here in support of Bin Laden.  Pre-emptively defending himself from the coming attacks from simple-minded reactionaries, Scheuer writes, "My aim in this book has been to portray Osama bin Laden - his thinking, behavior, and actions - in a way that accurately reflects the primary sources.  I have not tried to make him seem like an admirable man (though, as might have become clear, I respect his piety, integrity, and skills) but instead like a formidable enemy, one whom we have almost willfully misunderstood" (182).  During his talk at Powell's, he made it abundantly clear that he would pull the trigger on Bin Laden if given half the chance.  But his book takes Bin Laden on his terms, dispelling many myths and narratives presented about him, describing the man and his intentions.  He takes as his starting point George Washington Custis Lee's advice, "Live in the world you inhabit... Look upon things as they are.  Take them as you find them.  Make the best of them... Do not imagine things are going to happen as you wish.  Wish them to happen right.  Then strive to make them so" (xi).  Let's now consider some important lessons from his book:

1) What is Al Queda?
Given political and media discourse, it's hard to understand the different between al-Queda and the Taliban, and Bush did his best to make it difficult to understand its difference with Saddam Hussein's regime.  If you look at it from the standpoint of western ideology, al-Queda is a terrorist organization with the goal of spreading a particular brand of fundamentalist Islam throughout the world.  If you look at it from al-Queda's ideology, it's a multi-national organization open to "multiple nationalities, languages, religious practices, and ethnicities"fighting for the autonomy of Muslim nations and the dissolving of the state of Israel.  It's a group focused on ridding the Islamic world of Western influence.  It does not have as its goal the spreading of fundamentalist Islam throughout the world, and it did not attack the United States because of our freedom, or our liberalism, or with regard to gender equality in the States, which is exactly what Rudolf Giuliani espoused in the 2007 debate for the Republican Presidential nomination.  The truth is, 9/11 had nothing to do with resenting the fact that women wear bikinis or are allowed to work.

Al-Queda's been characterized as being "takfiri," which is a particularly intolerant brand of Islam that allows Muslims to decide who is and who is not a "good Muslim," providing the right to kill those deemed "bad."  Such a characterization has led to the belief that Al-Queda is seeking nothing short of carrying out a duty to kill non-Muslims, including US citizens.  Bin Laden, the leader of al-Queda, is not Takfiri.  His upbringing developed a sense of multiculturalism and a respect for difference.  Growing up in Saudi Arabia as the son of a millionaire, Bin Laden, the son of a Yemen immigrant, divided his time between working as a laborer and later a leader for his father's construction company amidst immigrants from all over the Islamic world, and attending reputable schools with the sons of rich businessmen.  He traveled to Afghanistan to help fight the Russians, and displayed profound respect and humility to the Afghan people, always emphasizing their central role in defeating imperialism (foreigners, like him, were there to assist, not to lead).  There he worked with mujahadin (Islamic freedom-fighters, or jihadists) from all over the Islamic world and never took on leadership roles lightly.  Such an upbringing guided some important guidelines for al-Queda: It would serve as support for struggles against Western Imperialism, and it would be multi-cultural and respectful of a great variety of Islamic practices.  It is not Takfiri.  Bin Laden has actually been attacked by Takfiri muslims, nearly murdered.

It's important to grasp this about al-Queda because it helps explain the organization's strength throughout the Middle East.  It doesn't discriminate between Muslims, which means it doesn't alienate the Muslim people, and it supports a number of organizations throughout the Middle East that fight Western Power and Influence.  It is distinguished from the Taliban as it is not particular to the political struggle in Afghanistan, but it provides support.  It's therefore much more elusive.  The US can come in and drive the Taliban to the outer reaches of Afghanistan (where they can then wait for the opportunity to come back out of the shadows), but how can it drive out an organization that is not local?  It's almost like fighting the world wide web - but where is the world wide web?  In this way, al-Queda does not follow the model of a typical terrorist organization.  It's elusive nature has actually led to debates about whether or not it actually exists.  Some scholars, including Gilles Kepel, have argued that it's a "hypothetical organization."   Scheuer argues that it most certainly does exist, but when we compare it to something like the Taliban, a local organization dealing directly with the fate of Afghanistan, it eludes us.  Scheuer writes, "Al-Queda... was founded by Osama bin Ladin and his colleagues, and... to this day they direct its operations."  It was created during the Afghan jihad era in the last years of the war against the Soviets, and it was "meant to keep Muslim attention to the jihad project after it lost the focus provided by the Red Army.  Al-Queda was also intended to provide support for jihad through its own media activities, military operations, and assistance to like-minded Muslims.  It was to provide a base from which the ummah-wide Islamist movement and potential adherents could be organized, trained, paid, and generally inspired.  Al-Queda, bin Laden would explain, was founded to give jihad 'the status of worship.'  Bin Laden also stressed that it is an organization open to all Muslims, not only Arabs... In Al-Queda, bin Laden declared, 'we (will) have no discrimination on the basis of color or race.  We cooperate with people on the basis of piety and righteousness... because we are one nation and one qiblah.'" (71-72).

Scheuer argues that traditional 'Terrorist Groups' are generally small and don't necessarily aim at victory, but rather publicity.  They don't typically cause a serious threat to the nation-state.  He argues that al-Queda is an 'Insurgent Group', which are groups that aim at victory and they are large and very difficult to pin-point.  They aren't as secretive as terrorist groups because a large part of their operations is propaganda.  Unlike Terrorist Groups, they do pose a serious threat to the nation-state.  These are the lines long which to consider al-Queda - not as a Terrorist Group, but as an Insurgent Group.  9/11 was not aimed at gaining publicity, but as part of a well-thought out military tactic aimed at destroying Western influence in the Middle East.  The following will explain that tactic.

2) What are Bin Laden's Objectives?
Bin Laden has declared war on the US twice.  In declaring war, he has provided us his three main objectives, none of which have been seriously considered by the politicians that have planned our wars in the Middle East (probably in large part responsible for our failures there).  His goals are

1) to bring America to bankruptcy
2) to spread out the US military and intelligence forces to the point where they have little reserves or flexibility
3) alienating former US allies and creating political divisiveness within the US  (viii).

The 9/11 attack was not designed for spectacle or publicity.  It was designed to lure the United States into a war in the Middle East that it couldn't win.  Bin Laden had been trying to reach that goal for years prior to it.  Having defeated the Red Army in Afghanistan, Bin Laden knew that the best way to defeat a Western Power was to engage it in a war it couldn't win.  This would radicalize potential insurgents and bleed the country of money which would in turn make its domestic matters worse.  We played right into his hands, and it appears all three of his goals have been reached.

3) How has our labeling of Bin Laden been destructive to our efforts in the Middle East?
In an effort to respect western-minded Muslims and, again, preserve Western Ideology, we have replaced terms that could describe Bin Laden and his associates like "Islamic," "Islamist," and "Jihadist," with the word "Extremist."  We've thus unearthed the man with our words, no longer considering him an influential figure for Muslims, but rather irreligious fanatics.  And yet, it shows incredible disrespect to Muslims to think that one man with apparently radical notions that have have nothing to do with mainstream Islam could hijack and reframe the faith of 1.5 million Muslims.  Bin Laden's jihad has been embraced throughout the Middle East and has been legitimized by numerous Islamic scholars and their various fatwas.  His talks and writings invoke Islamic history and culture, writing often in poetic verse.  He grew up exposed to a variety of Islamic scholars and scriptural interpretation.  Scheuer writes, "His knowledge of Islam was and is based on the Koran and the sunnah, as well as on his education, his family life, talks with scholars he met in his youth, his independent study of theology and Islamic history, and working and fighting alongside men who were trained scholars, most especially the Palestinian scholar Shaykh Abdullah Azzam" (41).  It's far too easy to write him off as a secular-minded politician who's tricked the Islamic people, but this, again, is a manifestation of Western Ideology.  Because he doesn't fit our mold, as a Muslim, we will consider him a manipulator of the religion.  As such, it's our duty in the US to heal pro-Bin Laden jihadists of the spell he's put them under, because if they were truly Muslim, they would not believe as he does.  But this is not the case - Bin Laden's incredible influence in the region means that he is not an extremist.  Muslims from many different backgrounds find meaning and value in his teachings.  They relate to his writings as Muslims.  To effectively interact in the Middle East, this needs to be understood.  We can not assume that there's one true Islam, which is inherently peaceful and does not prescribe violent defensive jihad.  This essentialist thinking brings about serious misinterpretations of what's going on in the Middle East, a region full of pro-jihadist Muslims.


There's much more to be drawn from Scheuer's book and I highly recommend it.  The conflict in the Middle East has had a tremendous impact on all our lives and by becoming informed about it, we might see truths hidden behind the dumbed-down, mindless analysis so readily available in the mainstream media.  Scheuer made a great point at Powell's - our politicians lie to us.  They come from ivy-league educations and they cannot truly believe the ridiculous verbage they convey to us.  How could it be that Scheuer, working in the CIA, could have such a developed and nuanced understanding of al-Queda and Bin Laden, and yet our Presidents (his bosses) could stupidly equate the group with Saddam Hussein and continually deliver a dumbed-down version of who Bin Laden is and what he's fighting for?  It's, of course, in the interest of Western Ideology that they would do this and in the interest of controlling public understanding, which is essential to gaining re-election and supporting the people funding them.  Because our political leaders lack, as Scheuer argues, the moral courage to give us the truth, we need to take it upon ourselves to understand the events that shape our era by challenging the ideological notions that frame our understanding and our actions.

For an engaging interview with the author, watch this:



(For the record, I am critical of Scheuer's Nationalism, which bleed into his ideas on foreign policy.  I find his book on Bin Laden extraordinarily balanced, and I find this interview very engaging, but don't think I'm in agreement with every argument he makes, although I find all his arguments worthy of serious consideration.)